Strengthening Europe’s response to FIMI
This blogpost was jointly drafted by the participants of the FIMI cluster meeting that was held on 10 October 2024 as part of EU DisinfoLab’s #Disinfo2024 conference in Riga, representing the six projects of the “Tackling FIMI in Europe” cluster. EU DisinfoLab is a partner in the ATHENA project.
With an aim to join hands and fight FIMI together, on 10 October 2024, the six EU-funded projects from our FIMI cluster (ATHENA, SAUFEX, RESONANT, DE CONSPIRATOR, ADAC.IO and ARM projects) convened for a meeting to address the growing threat of FIMI. The session provided a platform for sharing insights, aligning strategies, and proposing recommendations to counter this multifaceted challenge.
The FIMI cluster agreed that in order to strengthen our fight against FIMI we must adequately and clearly define FIMI and related terms. The need to clarify definitions emerged as a key discussion point, emphasising the importance of a unified understanding of FIMI incidents. While frameworks such as ABCDE, MITRE or DISARM offer promising models, inconsistencies across regions hinder effective collaboration. Stephen Campbell from the DISARM Foundation proposed employing definitions from the OASIS DAD-CDM project when they become available as a starting point to align our understanding of FIMI and to address inconsistencies within existing frameworks.
With the blurring between online and offline information manipulation, the issue of attribution emerges as a major obstacle to shaping response and countermeasures to FIMI. Advanced tactics such as those used by APT WeRedirect and Doppelganger make identifying perpetrators increasingly difficult.
The issue of attribution and response is further exacerbated by legal gaps due to the inconsistencies in national security frameworks across various member states. In addition, there are challenges in the implementation of existing obligations under regulations such as the Digital Services Act (DSA) that have not translated into concrete data-sharing practices for researchers and civil society organisations (CSOs).
The cluster members also highlighted the importance of a comparative approach in developing countermeasures tailoring responses to particular countries. The meeting examined Russia’s strategic use of FIMI to undermine democratic legitimacy, erode Western support for Ukraine, and exploit social vulnerabilities, such as immigration and minority issues. A cautionary note was raised about the risks of stigmatising diaspora communities, which could inadvertently serve Russia’s goals of destabilisation. In regions without significant Russian diasporas, the Kremlin has turned to far-right movements and corrupt networks to propagate its narratives. Finally, the DE-CONSPIRATOR consortium also raised concerns about an overemphasis on Russia as a FIMI threat actor, noting the need to broaden focus on other actors like China.
As the FIMI cluster discussed the timely challenges that FIMI poses, we collectively agreed on the importance of technology in countering FIMI. SAUFEX’s database tool will enable automated, machine-readable reporting to support resilience-building efforts. Large Language Models (LLMs) would help to compile and analyse evidence in complex cases. ARM stressed the importance of recognising that FIMI takes many different forms, including information suppression. They also stressed identifying pre-bunking strategies and proactive communication efforts that inoculate public narratives against disinformation before it spreads. Further, with information manipulation becoming the new way of doing politics and geopolitics, the cluster addressed the urgency of embedding media literacy in education systems.
With these FIMI cluster projects, we had an opportunity to learn lessons from the global state of FIMI, with examples from Russia, China, Rwanda and Ethiopia, and we generated the following key policy considerations from the FIMI cluster meeting:
- Expand laws to criminalise foreign interference and address FIMI explicitly (drawing on successful examples from the UK, Australia, Canada examples).
- Proposal for national service coordination under DSA with a focus on CSOs as key actors in the fight against FIMI.
- Pre-bunking initiatives: importance of strategic communication to inoculate public narratives before disinformation spreads.
- Scale technology solutions and leverage LLMs for evidence gathering and rapid response to incidents.
As our six EU-funded projects continue their collaborative efforts, we remain committed to developing a unified framework to address the geopolitical nuances of FIMI, to build European resilience to FIMI and to safeguard our democratic values.
This blogpost was originally published on the ATHENA project website: https://project-athena.eu/strengthening-europes-response-to-fimi/
