EU DisinfoLab’s mission is to raise awareness on disinformation and the manipulation of information, and contribute to a better information landscape.

We advocate for:

What matters most right now

DSA – from promise to practice

We advocate for the effective and consistent enforcement of the Digital Services Act (DSA) across all EU Member States. While the legal framework is firmly in place, its full potential remains underused. Our priority is to support and encourage national authorities (and the European Commission) to make full use of the tools available, ensuring the DSA delivers on its promise in practice.​

Driving deterrence

We support the use of sanctions as an important tool, but current enforcement measures fall short of creating meaningful deterrence. The absence of real consequences allows sanctioned entities to continue their harmful and illegal activities with limited accountability for them and their enablers. Our focus is on strengthening enforcement so that sanctions are not only available, but genuinely impactful in driving compliance and responsible behaviour.

Funding for evidence and accountability

We call for sustained and robust civil society funding under the next EU Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). At a time of growing geopolitical pressure and increasingly powerful tech actors, there is a real risk of weakening this essential counterbalance. Long-term European support is crucial to ensure civil society can continue to uphold accountability and the public interest.​

Policy priorities

EU DisinfoLab advocates for the next EU Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) to prioritise sustained investment in Europe’s democratic information ecosystem. We call for AgoraEU to explicitly support civil society counter-disinformation, alongside media funding, in order to strengthen resilience against foreign interference and manipulative influence operations.

No resilience without resources: funding the information ecosystem through AgoraEU

You can find EU DisinfoLab’s policy brief and materials on the MFF here.

Fighting disinformation through MFF support for civil society

Find examples of what has been achieved with current MFF funding here (pdf).

EU DisinfoLab supports strong Digital Services Act (DSA) enforcement, as a key tool to increase transparency and accountability in how online intermediaries distribute and moderate online content. Strong, consistent enforcement, backed by civil society evidence and oversight is crucial to protecting Europe’s information integrity and democratic resilience.

Digital Services Act (DSA) enforcement in the EU Member States

Learn more about our analysis of DSA enforcement on a national level here.

Malicious semi-compliance as the platform approach to EU regulation

Learn more about how platforms are avoiding meaningful compliance in our Malicious Semi-compliance blog post.

webinar: DSA: Unfolding the European Commission’s first decision against X

This webinar, part of our ‘Evidence & Enforcement’ series, explores the European Commission’s first non-compliance decision under the DSA.

webinar: Navigating the DSA Delegated Act on data access

This webinar explores how the DSA’s Article 40 data access mechanism and its delegated act enable researchers to study platform behaviour, strengthen transparency, and support more effective enforcement in practice.

EU DisinfoLab believes that sanctions are a crucial EU instrument against Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), but their impact remains limited due to inconsistent enforcement. The core challenge is not illegality of the content itself, but preventing sanctioned actors from accessing EU-based infrastructure and commercial services. EU DisinfoLab calls for more targeted enforcement to ensure sanctions effectively disrupt disinformation networks.

Building a common operational picture of FIMI

Read our recommendations in our report on building a common operational picture of FIMI here.

EU DisinfoLab supports the overall objective of the European Media Freedom Act to safeguard media freedom and pluralism, while warning against provisions that may weaken information integrity. We strongly opposed the inclusion of the Article 18 “media exemption,” which risks distorting incentives, by shielding problematic content from timely moderation.

EU DisinfoLab participated in the Commission’s call for consultations for Article 18 guidelines, suggesting that Article 18.1 (d) and (g) declarations should be automatically forwarded to the responsible national authorities, so that the veracity of declarations can be automatically checked by those bodies, if and when needed – after all, a core principle of the EU is that decisions should be taken as closely as possible to the citizen. The Commission did not include this recommendation in its guidelines.

Reject the media exemption

EU DisinfoLab previously campaigned against a media exemption when it was proposed in the DSA - find our position here.

Policy statement on Article 17 of the proposed European Media Freedom Act

Read our policy statement about Article 18 (originally Article 17 of the proposal) here.

EU DisinfoLab supports strict enforcement of the AI Act’s bans on manipulative AI systems and strong safeguards for high-risk applications. Transparency obligations for AI-generated and AI-manipulated content must be applied consistently to protect the information space. We are concerned that proposed rollbacks under the AI “simplification” (deregulation) agenda risk weakening oversight and accountability, even before the law is fully implemented.

AI Disinfo Hub

You can find an extensive list of resources on AI including news, webinars and research on our AI Disinfo Hub.

EU DisinfoLab is concerned that the Digital Omnibus, presented as simplification, would weaken key EU safeguards on data, AI, and cybersecurity. The proposed rollbacks would narrow protections for personal and inferred sensitive data, while allowing broader reuse of data for AI without consent, therefore  increasing risks of hyper personalisation, disinformation, and platform abuse.

You can find more resources on the topic by organisations such as EDRi and People v. BigTech.

EU DisinfoLab is not a signatory to the Code of Conduct on Disinformation (formerly Code of Practice), as it offers limited added value beyond existing legal obligations, while requiring significant civil society resources. Our analysis is that for platforms, the Code functions largely as reputational cover rather than a driver of meaningful accountability.

Webinar: The EU Code of Practice on disinformation: evaluating VLOPSE compliance and effectiveness

Watch a webinar about an EDMO report evaluating the effectiveness of the Code of Conduct here.

Brussels corner

In our Brussels corner, we share insights into EU policy, with updates on legislative files and developments at European level.

10/06/2026 - Fostering a democratic news ecosystem

Fostering a democratic news ecosystem

Emma Rafowicz (S&D, France) Alice Kuhnke (Greens/EFA, Sweden), the joint rapporteurs (parliamentary draftspersons) for the upcoming European Parliament’s scrutiny of the seven-year funding programme called “AgoraEU” have published their initial draft Report. One innovative and insightful suggestion that they make is to broaden the scope of the European Commission’s proposed “News” strand, in order to ensure that all relevant entities can be funded. They rename the strand “Democratic News Ecosystem”, and broaden the range of activities that can be funded with the aim, in their words, of “contributing to ensure greater democratic resilience across the Union.” This seems to be a pragmatic approach, echoing our established policy positions, which, if approved by the Parliament as a whole, will help us to better address the full range of threats faced by our democracies.

Technological Sovereignty Package

On 3 June, the European Commission proposed the Technological Sovereignty Package, as a response to Europe’s reliance on non-EU providers for over 80% of its digital goods. The initiative comprises four policy instruments:

  1. the Cloud and Artificial Intelligence Development Act (CADA),
  2. the Chips Act 2.0,
  3. the EU Open Source Strategy, and
  4. a Strategic Roadmap for Digitalisation and AI for Energy.

The CADA legislative proposal aims to triple data centre capacity by 2030 and it proposes 4 sovereignty assurance levels, aimed at assessing the sovereignty risk of the public administration cloud services; the Chips Act 2.0 will focus on creating a European demand for European chips; the Open Source Strategy promotes public procurement of open-source software rather than proprietary tools; and finally, the Energy Roadmap envisions how AI can support the digital autonomy of European energy systems, promoting AI grid optimisation, energy efficiency, balancing supply and demand in real time and favouring data sharing between energy operators.

VERAAI – the future of EU verification tools?

On 11 March, European Parliamentarian Ana Catarina Mendes (S&D, Spain) asked the European Commission, in light of the ending in October 2025 veraAI, and with no new call announced, whether there is a plan to keep free, European-made verification tools available for journalists and fact-checkers. This question is extremely pressing, considering the risk of underfunding of the verification infrastructure for fact-checkers and journalists, at a moment when AI-enabled FIMI is accelerating.

In its answer, the Commission listed ongoing initiatives, such as AI-CODE, EDMO, Creative Europe, a future European Democracy Shield research call, and cited €34 million invested under Horizon Europe. The Commission did not announce a dedicated follow-up funding call for open-access verification tools.

Roundtable on data access for vetted researchers

On 19 May 2026, the European Commission and the Digital Services Coordinators held discussions with major online platforms and search engines to launch the first applications for accessing relevant data according to the provisions of the Digital Services Act. 49 requests were made. They included requests related to illegal content, ad transparency, and AI-related functionalities.All the applications are currently undergoing review, while the coordinators highlighted that they have not yet finished creating guidelines that would allow researchers to make applications.Major online platforms shared information about the status of the work they are conducting, such as preparing their data catalogues. The Commission claims it will strictly ensure compliance with this obligation, referencing ongoing proceedings and the commitment of AliExpress, as well as the recently imposed fine of €120 million on X. For now, the framework is in place, but the progress towards results is slow.

The disinformation angle hiding inside the SIM card debate

On 11 April 2026, a coalition of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from Renew Europe, European People’s Party (EPP) and European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) groups tabled a joint parliamentary question (E-001477/2026) to the European Commission, touching on a rarely discussed topic while referring to disinformation: the infrastructure behind it.

The broader context for the question is that algorithmic disinformation can be based on fake engagement driven by dormant accounts that are activated when there is need for a coordinated push. To create these accounts, social media platforms, such as WhatsApp, Telegram, Meta, Google and TikTok, verify the authenticity of an account by linking it with a functioning  telephone number. The problem is that, by swapping out the cards,a single telephone can use an almost unlimited number of anonymous prepaid SIM cards, allowing a single person to manage a large number of accounts. This phenomenon is reinforced by European SIM box operators selling apparently legitimate European SIM cards to users around the world. The evidence comes from Latvia, where Europol shut down a network of hundreds of thousands of SIM cards.

The MEPs ask if the Commission has plans for a harmonisation of EU SIM registration rules. European countries currently have different minimum requirements for purchasing SIM cards, and only 19 countries require registration. This makes it easier to start and spread disinformation campaigns.

On the other hand, one could argue that it would be news if the EU institutions were not talking about anonymous SIM cards. The topic never seems to quite go out of fashion, as this EU Council document from 15 years ago demonstrates.

Bulgaria's parliamentary elections: domestic disinformation, platform gaps, and the limits of the DSA

On 4 May, the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield (EUDS) in the European Parliament organised an exchange of views on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) and the integrity of the electoral process during the most recent parliamentary elections in Bulgaria. The participants were the Bulgarian Foreign Minister Velizar Shalamanov, the journalist Christo Grozev, and Antoinette Nikolova from Balkan Free Media Initiative (BFMI), a Bulgarian monitoring organisation.

Less FIMI, more DIMI

The Bulgarian government’s position was that there was no sign of any significant foreign information manipulation, despite reports being submitted every week to the Prime Minister’s office, and despite strong collaboration between Bulgaria and the European External Action Service’s (EEAS) FIMI. According to them, the main battleground was domestic.

The monitoring carried out by the BFMI and by the journalist Christo Grozev found that there was an already well-established network within the country for the creation and dissemination of disinformation. The social media contents of Rumen Radev, winner of the elections, were quickly boosted by algorithms to 9 million views among a population base of only 6,5 million people, with his engagement increasing by 83.000%. 

The speakers also underlined the importance of cooperation with civil society and more specifically with social media platforms. Bulgaria engaged the Digital Services Act (DSA) and sought EEAS assistance but had no operational clarity about which content could actually be deleted, especially in such a country where most of the speech does not fall foul of the law. TikTok proactively approached Bulgarian BFMI, cooperated efficiently and proposed to collaborate also during the Bosnian elections. In contrast, the speakers from BFMI explained that Meta was withholding data and discovered no coordinated inauthentic behavior, directly contradicting the monitoring data provided. 

Three asks to Brussels

Three specific recommendations were suggested by Grozev: 

  1. Develop a consistent definition of coordinated inauthentic behaviour on social media sites, so that some platforms cannot deny evidence from researchers; 
  2. Enforce more efficiently the Digital Services Act on major social media companies;
  3. Allow national digital coordinators real access to data, because civil society alone is not enough.

Joint committee work on the AgoraEU funding package gets underway

Work is continuing apace in the preparation of the European Parliament’s position on the AgoraEU funding package. Due to the inclusion of the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme in AgoraEU, this is crucial for the fight against disinformation.

Unusually, two committees are in joint charge of the file – Culture (CULT) and Civil Liberties (LIBE). Deliberations of the joint CULT/LIBE committee structure will start in public in June with a lot of progress already achieved behind the scenes on the draft Report. This work will be supported by other relevant committees, which will provide advisory “Opinions” on the proposal. The draft opinions of the Gender Equality (FEMM) and Budgetary Control (CONT) committees have already been published, as have the proposed amendments of the FEMM Committee . The Parliament has prepared a thorough summary of the AgoraEU proposal 

Digital Services Act: developments in enforcement

“Let him who is without sin cast the first stone,” as the famous quotation from the Bible says. Not without justification, the European Commission has been lobbing a lot of stones, or infringement proceedings, at EU Member States, for failing to live up to their obligations under the Digital Services Act. These infringement proceedings are putting pressure on the Member States that haven’t already done so, to appoint duly empowered Digital Service Coordinators to enforce the DSA in their jurisdiction.

Yet, if we look at the European Commission itself, it is far from without sin. It has failed completely in its role as enforcement authority for very large online platforms (VLOPs) and Very Large Online Search Engines (VLOSES) with regard to even the simplest and clearest provision in the DSA – the Article 38 requirement to provide a non-profiling-based feed. In the end, a Dutch NGO had to take matters into its own hands and go to court, and win. Similarly the Gesellschaft für Freiheitsrechte (Society for Freedom Rights, GFF) gave up waiting for the Commission to take action, and took a case to court in Berlin to enforce its right under the DSA to order X to provide data access to researchers for monitoring misinformation, and won. 

Maybe it is time for the EU Member States to lob some stones back in the direction they came from. In relation to implementation of article 260(3) of the Lisbon Treaty on non-transposition of EU laws into national law, the Commission said that it “considers that the Article 260(3) instrument [legal proceedings] should be used as a matter of principle in all cases of failure to fulfil an obligation”.

As a matter of the same principle, maybe the Member States should start looking to test legal solutions when it is the Commission itself that is not respecting its obligations.

webinar series: Evidence & enforcement

EVIDENCE & ENFORCEMENT | As one of the first private enforcement actions under the DSA, this webinar examines the landmark cases brought by DRI and the GFF against X over access to platform data under Article 40(12).
EVIDENCE & ENFORCEMENT | The DSA gives the European Commission exclusive enforcement powers over VLOPs and VLOSEs, while national authorities supervise other intermediaries. This creates a dependency and raises the question of Member State options if the Commission fails in its role.
Article 38 of the DSA requires platforms to offer a non-profiling version of their services. After Meta’s flawed implementation, Bits of Freedom took the case to court, and won, twice: what lessons can be drawn from this landmark case?
This Community Insider webinar explores how civil society organisations contribute evidence under the DSA, drawing lessons from the X case to examine practical challenges, risks, and what effective engagement with the Commission looks like in enforcement proceedings.
Generative AI is reshaping online content creation and testing the foundations of EU platform regulation. As the Digital Services Act (DSA) distinguishes between hosting and creating content, AI systems that generate outputs raise new questions about liability, safe harbour protections, and their interaction with the AI Act.
This webinar unpacks the European Commission’s first-ever DSA non-compliance decision – fining X €120 million – examining the legal reasoning, key breaches identified, and what the landmark ruling means for civil society’s role in shaping DSA enforcement.