Authors: Jessica Giandomenico and Hanna Linderstål, Earhart Business Protection Agency
Reviewer: Per Enerud, Psychological Defence Agency of Sweden
Introduction
- While disinformation on several topics, such as climate change and the efficiency of vaccines, is present in the Swedish information landscape, the general population is not overly receptive to outright falsehoods. That is often explained through the fact that Swedes, compared to other populations, places high trust in authorities, science, and society. They are also generally well-educated with a high level of awareness about the need to not believe everything that is written or reproduced. This has led many analysts to conclude that Swedes have somewhat difficulty believing in detectable disinformation. However, high levels of social trust can allow disinformation actors to work systematically to build credibility on social media, making them appear trustworthy even when they make dubious statements.
- Disinformation is present in the Swedish information landscape less as clear narratives driven by well-identifiable actors, but rather as small fractions of discourses presented and shared both as misinformation and deliberate disinformation. As a result, it is difficult to clearly point out and prove that certain opinions contribute to a false or distorted information landscape, since many pieces of disinformation are embedded within legitimate democratic discourse and are often presented in isolation.
- We notice a significant number of suspected false accounts on different social media platforms posing as trustworthy actors. A typical example could be a man energetically discussing national security on LinkedIn and having hundreds of legitimate contacts, despite his professional background being unrelated to security. At the same time, a dormant Facebook account with the same name and photo shows a person with only a handful of contacts. The account is actively building trust and audience on one platform while displaying all the signs of inauthenticity on others. Another typical example involves a person who becomes highly engaged in a topic, such as Tesla cars or the benefits of yoga, sharing insights, offering advice, and actively participating in groups and communities. At some point, that account suddenly starts expressing unrelated opinions or promoting ideas or products disconnected from the original topic. If such accounts are indeed inauthentic, they may be strategically developed to serve a hidden purpose. Once they have gained a platform, audience and trust, they can be used to disseminate disinformation and push specific narratives. Meanwhile, such accounts focus on building trust, legitimacy and connections.
- Grievances and social problems in Swedish society have led to an increased distrust in public institutions and public actors. This distrust can escalate quickly when such grievances are exploited, especially if pieces of disinformation are already circulating and perceived as a normal part of the information environment. One such example is the campaign against Swedish social services in 2022-2023, which spread the false narrative that the Swedish social services systematically removed children from Muslim immigrant families. The resulting mistrust and anger towards the social services are still influencing the working conditions and safety of social workers.
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The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of EU DisinfoLab. This factsheet does not represent an endorsement by EU DisinfoLab of any organisation.