Author(s): Ciprian Cucu, PhD. Lecturer in communication sciences at the West. University of Timișoara, Romania. Trainer, writer, and researcher in media literacy and countering disinformation.
Contributor: Susanna Dragomir, University Babes-Bolyai and EU SPIN Research & Consulting
Reviewer: Madalina Botan, Associate Professor National University of Political Studies and Public Administration (SNSPA)
Updated 03/11/2025
Introduction
- The Romanian media ecosystem has developed its own alternative news networks and channels that spread anti-EU narratives, combined with apocalyptic news, conspiracies, pro-Kremlin narratives, neo-fascist content, Dacian mythology etc. Many times, especially on cultural issues (e.g. LGBTQ rights, sexual education), they copy false narratives from US and UK alternative and fringe media.
Compared to the past years, antisemitic disinformation has been rising along with anti-France and anti-Macron disinformation whilst the Chinese propaganda starts to be more prominent on TikTok.
The ‘sovereigntist’ movement (bridging nationalism, populism, and a conspiracy mentality) is the main force behind disinformation. The movement includes journalists and media outlets, social media influencers, politicians, and other public figures, such as religious and cultural personalities. Despite frequently spreading false narratives (or rather because of this), sovereigntists became a significant political force, with self-described sovereigntist parties taking around 35% of the seats in the Romanian Parliament. - Romania does not have a strong cultural, historical, or economic relation to Russia. There is no relevant Russian minority, Romanians do not speak Russian, there are no Russian radio or TV stations. In Romania, Russian disinformation is efficient as it takes over autonomous narratives, being camouflaged by proxies and mobilising old communist ties. Besides, it gets spread by political parties and movements, NGOs, think tanks, religious figures, former and current journalists, influencers, and cultural or academia personalities.
- During 2024-2025, Russian involvement has become more direct and overt, culminating with the interference in the 2024 presidential elections. (The November 2024 elections were annulled by the Romanian Constitutional Court after a marginal political figure (C. Georgescu) won the first round (with ~23% of the votes) but was found to have used illegal campaign funds and to have benefited from illegal campaigning mechanisms that included Russian support. The elections were redone in May 2025, with some Russian officials directly alleging the process was not legitimate, and various pro-Russian messages being intensively shared on social media.) In the aftermath of the elections, we have seen the first misinformation agent (Cozmin Gușă) stating he is pro-Russian, as well as openly pro-Russian messages on social media, including users suggesting they would rather fight for Russia in case of war.
- Resilience against disinformation is very low: Romania is second to last in the EU countries on media literacy. A 2022 report concluded that “Romanians have internalised global conspiracist narratives (…) and erroneous information have prevailed over arguments presented by the scientific community or by authorities”. There are significant issues in the media landscape; an RFS report highlights issues with media financing and owners pressuring editorial decisions. The silver lining is that there is a strong, however underfunded, independent media sector; while it doesn’t get the same visibility as mainstream media, they have become very relevant due to their investigations.
- Romanian authorities have so far failed to effectively tackle disinformation. There are some plans on paper, e.g., The National Strategy for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation, but implementation of measures is lacking. In the last year, some politicians as well as ANCOM (DSA responsible for Romania) and CNA (the agency responsible for monitoring audio-visual media content) have taken a more active role, but some initiatives have been criticized for being confusing and overreaching.
- Romanian legislation includes several bills and ordinances that deal with disinformation: art. 404 of the Penal Code makes communicating false information a felony, if there is a danger to National Security; law 504/2002 regarding audiovisual content and the CNA code republished in 2025; law 50/2024 which implements the Digital Services Regulation (EU) 2022/2.065; emergency ordinance 1/2025, adopted in the follow-up to the annulment of the 2024 elections. However, the penal code provision has not yet been used, and the 2025 ordinance has been criticized for lack of transparency and infringing on free speech.
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The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of EU DisinfoLab. This factsheet does not represent an endorsement by EU DisinfoLab of any organisation.