Dear Disinfo Update readers,

In this special edition of the Disinfo Update, we are bringing you insights on the recent US presidential election. We explore topics such as FIMI, social media platforms’ responses to disinformation, and actions taken by government officials and agencies.

Our webinars

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  • 14 November: Latvian resilience to disinformation (with the support of the German Embassy in Latvia) – Countering disinformation requires for public authority to evolve in their missions, especially in educating key audiences on how disinformation spreads. In 2022, the Latvian State Chancellery edited a guide for local public authorities on how to counter disinformation. A podcast on YouTube with regular guests has been launched. Dr Rihards Bambals, from the State Chancellery in Latvia, will discuss this strategy and its successes.
  • 28 November: Building FIMI resilience through models of practice: Taiwan’s 2024 elections – Foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) is a shared challenge for democracies across the globe. Faced with China’s well-resourced FIMI campaigns against Taiwan’s 13 January 2024 election, the island’s resilience has been closely studied. To equip others to readily learn from Taiwan’s experience, Taiwanese civil society organisation Doublethink Lab worked with Ben Graham Jones to document the key characteristics of Taiwan’s FIMI resilience. The ultimate aim is to reach beyond the information integrity community and provide strategic fuel for decision-makers to envision goals for whole-society resilience. This webinar will discuss the findings and consider the long-term direction of global FIMI resilience.

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FIMI

  • Multi-pronged FIMI: DFRLab reports the amplification of Russian disinformation by a Chinese bot network. This includes manipulated videos alleging rigged voting,  destroyed ballots, malfunctioning machines, and votes cast under the names of deceased individuals.
  • Disinformation blitz: US security agencies have described Russian disinformation as a significant threat to election integrity in the US. A joint statement from the FBI, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency warns that  Russian disinformation increases the risk of inciting violence.
  • Fake bomb threat: According to the Georgia Secretary of State, non-credible bomb threats against polling places originated from Russia. Five affected polling locations extended their hours of operation. Fulton County police reported that a total of 32 bomb threats were made against these five polling sites.
  • Russian fake video: A video falsely depicting the destruction of mail-in ballots has been linked to Russian actors, according to US officials. A joint statement from several US intelligence agencies reports  that “this Russian activity is part of Moscow’s broader effort to raise unfounded questions about the integrity of the US election and stoke divisions among Americans.” 
  • Telecom hacks: Allegations of telecom hacking are being investigated by US agencies. China has reportedly breached multiple telecom companies and targeted US presidential candidates Donald Trump and Kamala Harris. The FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigations) and CISA (Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency) released a statement confirming  they are “investigating the unauthorised access to commercial telecommunications infrastructure by actors affiliated with the People’s Republic of China.”
  • Walz targeted with disinformation: Vice Presidential candidate Tim Walz has been targeted by a Russian disinformation campaign alleging sexual misconduct. The debunked claims suggest that Walz had an inappropriate relationship with a student while he was a teacher in Minnesota. The rumour was sparked by a video featuring a man claiming to be a former student of Walz; researchers have linked this video to Russian disinformation operations.
  • FIMI from all fronts: According to Microsoft, foreign influence campaigns have attempted to influence the US elections from China, Iran, and Russia. Microsoft reports that Russia has focused on targeting the Harris-Walz campaign, Iran has pushed for an election boycott due to candidates’ support for Israel, and China has targeted down-ballot candidates (those running for low-profile positions) as well as members of Congress.

Government responses

  • Election infrastructure: A senior official of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency stated,  “At this point, we are not currently tracking any national-level significant incidents impacting security of our election infrastructure”. Despite the absence of incidents directly affecting election infrastructure, the official also said “We do have foreign adversaries with two objectives, one to undermine the American people’s confidence in our democratic institutions, and the second to sow partisan discord… and so we should expect to continue to see narratives around those types of objectives, both today and in the days and weeks to come.”
  • FBI impersonation: The FBI issued warnings about videos spreading false claims about the election, falsely claiming to be published by the agency. The videos used the FBI insignia to imply the agency’s authority. The FBI has not disclosed who is responsible for creating and sharing the videos.
  • Election officials prepare: Ahead of the US presidential election, election officials in swing states had to prepare for a highly contested race marked by misinformation and conspiracy theories. Daniel Baxter, Detroit’s Chief Operating Officer for absentee voting and special projects, said, “We plan for a riot…We just want to make sure that we have planned for the worst as we hope for the best.”
  • Musk and Michigan: The US elections have experienced interference and disinformation at both the federal and state levels. One instance of state-level interference involves Elon Musk. Michigan Secretary of State, Jocelyn Benson, has accused  Musk of spreading “dangerous disinformation” after he reposted a video claiming, “Michigan has more registered voters than eligible citizens!” Benson fact-checked this claim and shared a website with accurate election information. 

Platforms

  • X and disinformation: This article discusses the spread of disinformation on social media. One post on X, describing someone dropping off ballots as “very suspicious”, went viral and quickly rose to the top of X’s “Election Integrity” feed. The article also covers social media platforms’ responses and the “Stop the Steal” narrative.
  • Organising on Telegram: In the lead-up to the 2024 U.S. election, right-wing groups increasingly turned to Telegram to organise and spread election-related narratives, particularly focusing on upholding “election integrity”. One message on the platform stated, “The day is fast approaching when fence sitting will no longer be possible…You will either stand with the resistance or take a knee and willingly accept the yoke of tyranny and oppression.” 
  • Meta blocks election ads: Meta extended its block on new election ads in the week ahead of the election and for several days afterwards. By banning new election ads in the days following the election, Meta intended to prevent confusion and misinformation while the votes were being counted.
  • Meta & ads: ProPublica discusses deceptive advertising networks on Facebook and Meta’s failure to prevent these networks from launching new pages and ads. While Meta was able to remove some of these ads, it failed to identify and remove all of them.
  • Funding misinformation: X users who share election misinformation are being paid thousands of dollars by the social media platform. These users have created networks that allow them to amplify each other’s posts, boosting their reach and revenue. Some of these networks support Donald Trump, while others back Kamala Harris.

This week’s recommended read

Raquel Miguel, Senior Researcher of EU DisinfoLab, recommends reading “How to Detect and Analyse Identity-Based Disinformation/FIMI.”

Identity has played an important role in the US elections: disinformation has circulated against the Democratic candidate Kamala Harris based on her gender, among other things, and framed in Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) campaigns.

At a more opportune time than ever, the European External Action Service (EEAS) has released a practical guide to conducting open-source investigations to detect and analyse identity-based disinformation with FIMI purposes. The document, developed in collaboration with EU DisinfoLab,  highlights a selection of third-party open-source tools and methodologies to incorporate an “identity lens” in OSINT investigations and to provide victims and activists with the basic tools to detect attacks and collect evidence.

Reading & resources

  • Community notes are ineffective: The Center for Countering Digital Hate has published a report on the failure of the “Community Notes” feature on X. Despite its intended role of providing accurate information to counter misleading posts, CCDH has found that this feature is not effectively addressing false claims about the US elections.
  • Foreign interference in the US: DFRLab has published an article discussing the role of foreign interference in the US elections. The article discusses announcements from the intelligence community regarding foreign interference, resources on disinformation, and tools for tracking cases of foreign interference. 
  • AI and electoral disinformation: This article argues that AI has not revolutionised electoral disinformation but instead follows the same playbook that has plagued past US elections. While many common trends in electoral disinformation persist, some of the most prevalent include false claims of electoral irregularities as proof of fraud, unsubstantiated allegations that authorities are committing fraud, and misinformation regarding voter eligibility.
  • Disinformation trends: The Guardian discusses the spread of misinformation by multiple actors, including Russia, Elon Musk, and Donald Trump. Threats against polling places were attributed to Russia, Musk shared a video that appeared to reference the QAnon conspiracy theory, and Trump made claims of election cheating. 
  • FIMI and Trump: The Wall Street Journal discusses the potential dismantling of the Global Engagement Center under the Trump administration. The Global Engagement Center is the US State Department division responsible for identifying and exposing foreign interference and disinformation campaigns.
  • Effect of misinformation: Marianna Spring, the BBC’s disinformation and social media specialist, discusses the impact of disinformation on the US presidential election. She addresses allegations of voter fraud and Trump’s claims of “cheating” in Philadelphia. Additionally, Spring describes the promotion of false claims by both Trump and Harris supporters.
  • AI election tool: Perplexity, an AI start-up, has launched an AI-powered hub designed to provide accurate information about the US election. The hub uses data from the Associated Press, but despite its goal of delivering accurate election information, the hub has struggled to do so. For example, the AI tool failed to mention that Robert F. Kennedy had dropped out of the race. 
  • Mis/disinformation tracker: Newsguard has created a database that tracks election misinformation, including websites and social media accounts that publish false or misleading information. The database also monitors partisan websites that claim to be politically neutral.
  • Foreign interference tracking: DFRLab has published “Interference 2024”, a resource that tracks instances of foreign interference in the US elections. The resource provides the date of attribution, the source that identified it, the nation behind the interference (if determined), and the campaign it is linked to.