Amid escalating and increasingly sophisticated disinformation and FIMI campaigns, the challenge goes well beyond hostile states. Platform policy rollbacks and political shifts in several countries are adding new hurdles; at the same time, some actors are trying to reframe counter-disinformation work as “censorship” and even urging non-compliance with European laws designed to address those threats. Together, these dynamics are increasing the pressure on the counter-disinformation community. EU DisinfoLab documents these emerging risks across Europe—with a close look at Germany—in a new report prepared for the Friedrich Nauman Foundation.
Executive summary
- As threat actors are growing in number and sophistication and technological advances make malicious activities easier and more effective, the counter-disinformation community faces mounting challenges. The picture is further complicated by rising geopolitical tensions and hybrid warfare, combining disinformation, FIMI, and related manipulative practices.
- Challenges also come from within. Domestic political shifts in several countries are eroding democratic safeguards, contributing to an environment that leaves rollbacks in platform policies largely uncontested, and weakening counter-disinformation efforts. Political developments in the U.S. echo across the Atlantic, affecting Europe at the very moment when some platforms are loosening controls against the threats policy-makers seek to contain. Practitioners now face a dual hurdle: hostile external actors on one side, and an increasingly adverse political and corporate environment on the other.
- The EU has built strong resilience through regulations such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Digital Services Act (DSA). This framework distinguishes Europe from regions with weaker protections. Yet enforcing these safeguards is proving increasingly difficult under rising external and internal pressures.
- Germany illustrates both promise and vulnerability. Determined in its efforts to enforce the DSA, it nonetheless faces setbacks in platform moderation and political fragility at home. Given the country’s central role in the European Union, its resilience will be decisive. Public debate reflects this dynamic: while some initiatives emphasise privacy protections, data access, and checks on platform abuses, others call for greater digital sovereignty.
- In this environment, Europe must strengthen its defences not only against adversarial actors but also against hostile political and corporate dynamics. Sustained resilience depends on recognising and addressing this multifaceted landscape to safeguard the integrity of the European information space.
Introduction
The fight against information manipulation and related distortions stands at a contradictory juncture. On the one hand, awareness has never been higher as people, political actors, and decision-makers increasingly recognise the threat, frequently refer to it in public interventions, and express the intention to act.
On the other hand, the threats are multiplying. Several drivers fuel the escalation of disinformation, Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), and other deceptive practices: intensifying geopolitical tensions and armed conflicts, the rapid digitalisation of critical infrastructures, and accelerating technological development – all of which sustain the rise of hybrid warfare.
Within this context, information manipulation takes the form of orchestrated disinformation campaigns, broader FIMI strategies, propaganda, and even financially motivated scams. These practices often overlap, blurring the boundaries between political, economic, and criminal motivations. At the same time, growing access to advanced technologies – particularly artificial intelligence – has widened the pool of actors capable of exploiting such tools for malicious purposes.
Crucially, the challenge is no longer external to the EU. The counter-disinformation community increasingly operates in a hostile political and institutional environment. A recent example came during Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s 2025 State of the Union address, when she was interrupted by dissenting shouts as she announced the creation of the European Centre for Democratic Resilience. Parliament President Roberta Metsola warned MEP Christine Anderson (AfD) that she would be removed from the chamber if she continued interrupting proceedings.
The rise of nationalist and conservative forces has brought elites into office that are sometimes resistant, or even openly opposed, to counter-FIMI initiatives, thereby undermining the work of practitioners and the overall resilience and trust in democratic processes. Meanwhile, major digital platforms have rolled back key policies designed to curb mis- and disinformation. These political and corporate retreats add a new layer of difficulty, forcing defenders to contend with both exogenous state and non-state actors and endogenous obstacles.
Against this backdrop, the European Union in general, and Germany in particular, demonstrates notable resilience, thanks to a regulatory framework unparalleled in other regions. Yet its effective enforcement is increasingly at risk.
This report examines how the current context affects the EU’s capacity to counter information manipulation, with a focus on Germany’s defensive measures. It concludes by arguing for the maintenance and expansion of protective mechanisms to address both external threat actors and the increasingly adverse political and platform environments shaping the fight against disinformation. While Germany is used as a focal case study, it is important to note that the drivers, threats, and responses are overwhelmingly European in scope, making it difficult to fully disentangle country-specific dynamics from the broader continental landscape.
This publication is a deliverable written by Raquel Miguel and Maria Giovanna Sessa (EU DisinfoLab) for the Friedrich Naumann Foundation
