

# DebunkEU.org

---

EU Disinfo Lab 2021

“Understanding Disinformation Across Europe”

Viktoras Dauksas, Head of DebunkEU.org

Click to follow us on:



# DebunkEU.org IN A NUTSHELL



8 countries

100+ reports per year

50 active Lithuanian elves



110+ events

18 countries



350+ interviews and mentions global media, including:



DebunkEU.org is a **disinformation analysis center and independent technology think tank** which:



Analyses disinformation in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Georgia and Montenegro



Monitors online election campaigns,



Organises community training,



Carries out media literacy campaigns,

# SHORT/MID TERM STRATEGIES & TACTICS



# GOOD PRACTICES: METHODOLOGY



## Step #1

Source identification  
(who?)

- What are the most frequent issues addressed by the author, the website, or the media outlet?
- Is it a reliable and trustworthy source of information?
- When was the last time the source and/or author published information?



## Step #2

Content assessment  
(how?)

- Does the content (e.g. photos, quotes, interviews, posts) seem suspicious?
- Is the headline shocking and/or emotional?
- Does the text in the article support the heading?
- What message is the author trying to convey?
- What set of rhetorical techniques are used to address the reader?





## Step #3

Circumstance assessment  
(when?)

- What circumstances and/or context surround the appearance of information?
- Is the article or social media of the repetitive nature, i.e. does it have a corresponding 'structure'/similarities with other narratives or sources, that are interested in particular issues?

# GOOD PRACTICES: METHODOLOGY





Vertical AI allows to focus on a **targeted task**, which is important when analysing disinformation. It is a complex chain of actions and each of them has a **designated algorithm**.

**At DebunkEU.org we distinguish between two processes:**




## 1. Discovery of disinformation

Here the **task** for the AI is to **spot and predict the most harmful stories** which then are going to be reviewed by our analysts. The data that our team has already labelled will be used to further **train** the AI to recognize similar content thus **saving the time and effort**.


## 2. Analysis of disinformation

When analysis is done, it is partly automated and partly manual. The **automated tasks require 99 % precision rate**. If the algorithm is less precise, this part is done manually, and **when new data sets are collected we start automating again**.



When automating processes, we are making sure that an algorithm, given a specific task, performs it at the **highest precision rate**.

# GOOD PRACTICES: PROCESS



# COVID-19 DISINFORMATION



## DebunkEU.org analysis of COVID-19 disinformation


March 2020 - June 2021

Reports published: **20**

Cases of disinfo found: **11 174**

### TECHNIQUES

Share of techniques by articles




Techniques by Debunk/Recheck



February 2021

### TRIGGER STORIES

FB posts: picking up and spreading false and misleading content



### NARRATIVES



What we

The first narrative of the Russian Sputnik-V vaccine is a disinformation campaign. The Russian government has been spreading false information about the vaccine, claiming it is safe and effective. This is a disinformation campaign designed to undermine confidence in the vaccine and the health system.

Our analysis

The article comes as a part of several recurring pro-Kremlin narratives with regards to Ukraine, first, groundless claims of Ukraine being a puppet of Western countries, blindly following their orders. In addition, it undermines the sovereignty of the country and belittles it to the status of a third world country, which is a classic pro-Kremlin disinformation tactic.



# SCOPE

**481,416**

From January to June 2021, DebunkEU.org detected 481,416 articles related to COVID-19, posted by hostile media sources.

**35,549**


Of these, analysts with DebunkEU.org reviewed 35,549 articles with potentially harmful content.

**9,297**

9,297 articles with false and misleading content from 397 media outlets (including 214 Facebook groups) in English, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish and Russian languages were identified.




The impact that the analysed articles had on the audience was evaluated at 3.7 billion potential contacts, as measured by DebunkReach®.




# DYNAMICS



Monthly dynamics by mentions





Monthly dynamics by DebunkReach®



In the first half of 2021, **January stood out** as the month with the lowest number of articles analysed by the team of DebunkEU.org (909 hits) and yet with the second-highest figure in terms of the audiences affected (755.5 million potential contacts): it was the only month when **English led in terms of the impact it made with regards to reach**, as the **English-language outlet of RT** – a television and internet-based news channel and one of the most important purveyors of Kremlin propaganda - was busy **spreading and amplifying false and/or misleading claims about Western COVID-19 vaccines** (hyperbolising the effects of adverse reactions, failing to provide missing context for the articles about deaths linked to vaccination yet without any proved causal relation) at the background of then recently launched national vaccination programmes. Using the tried-and-tested rhetoric of people-elite dichotomy, RT was also **escalating in attempts to show how policymakers of the West were failing to fight COVID-19** via frustrating lockdowns.





# TYPES OF CONTENT



The share of **disinformation** within the false and misleading content on COVID-19 in H1 2021 stood at **91.4%**, as measured by articles. With regards to **DebunkReach®**, the share amounted to **97.0%**.


**Roughly 72% of misinformation** (579 hits) within the period of analysis was found in **Facebook groups and pages**, hence its share as measured by affected audiences was lower than that measured by hits.

However, 2,767 more articles from the social media platform, constituting **82.7% of all Facebook hits** analysed within the period, were **classified as disinformation**, i.e., were found to be conscious efforts to spread and amplify deceptive claims. This may evidence a **growing awareness of manipulated information** and our growing resistance to it and yet an already established **polarisation of society in terms of views on the pandemic** and the means to fight it (such as lockdown and vaccination programmes) simultaneously, as the volume of misinformation has been declining, whereas some **sporadic efforts of spreading misleading content** with regards to COVID-19 have **translated into systematic disinformation push**.



# NARRATIVES

## Top 5 narratives & subnarratives by articles




**False measures to fight COVID-19** was the **top narrative** within the false and misleading coverage on COVID-19 in the first half of 2021, as **measured by articles**. The subnarrative **Vaccine has been developed without rigorous testing** added the most to its leading position and was **the most pronounced rhetoric** overall owing to national immunisation campaigns rolling out and accelerating in the targeted countries. As much as 84.5% of the second most prevalent subnarrative within the umbrella of **False measures to fight COVID-19**, **West seeks to discredit Russian and Chinese vaccines** came out in Russian language. Roughly 40% of the hits claiming **Violation of liberties in the name of COVID-19** was in place and that **Quarantine was unnecessary measure to fight COVID-19** came in Lithuanian language signalling the vectors of claims posted mostly by Facebook users in reaction to lockdown restrictions and (planned) vaccination certificates. It was also domestic, Lithuanian language false and misleading content, escalating the rhetoric of **Lithuania failing to fight COVID-19** (almost 77%): on contrary to the last months of 2020, when it was pro-Kremlin media promoting the narrative of Lithuania being a failure in the fight against novel coronavirus, juggling the sadly whopping numbers of new cases in the country, in the first four months of 2021 Lithuanian Facebook users were actively posting about lockdown being a sign of failure to successfully, without significant collateral damage, handle the pandemic. It is also worth to note that **conspiracy theories** were most popular in Poland: around 83% of the hits classified under **COVID-19 is used by political elites to control humankind** as well as **COVID-19 (or vaccines) was designed to depopulate mankind** came in Polish language.



# NARRATIVES

## Top 5 narratives & subnarratives by DebunkReach®



The differences in the charts displaying the leading narratives and subnarratives measured by the number of articles and by DebunkReach® highlight the rhetoric, which was pursued by major Kremlin-aligned media sources, affecting wide audiences, showcasing the narratives that they engaged in promoting the most.

Thus, although *False measures to fight COVID-19* led with regards to affected audiences just as it did in terms of hits, it was *West seeks to discredit Russian and Chinese vaccines* that added the moos to it, outpacing *Vaccine has been developed without rigorous testing* (for comparison, the latter accounted for 2791 hits and a reach of 620.8 million potential contacts, whilst the former – 858 articles and 782.7 million potential contacts.)

Differences were also visible in within the *Country fails to fight COVID-19* subnarrative lineup: here, pro-Kremlin media outlets' international editions produced articles amplifying the messages on how *the US* (escalated in Q2 the most) *and the UK were failing to fight COVID -19*. It was also wide-reaching Kremlin-aligned media to promote the messages that the EU and NATO were failing to handle the pandemic: the narrative *Failure of international organisations* ranked fourth in terms of reach, whilst occupying sixth position as measured by articles.

# DISINFORMATION AGAINST LITHUANIAN POSITION ON THE BELARUSIAN NPP



## DebunkEU.org and LMFA ANALYSIS ON THE BELARUSIAN NPP

January - June 2021

Reports published: **6**

Mis/disinformation cases found: **1202**



Since the start of the Belarusian Nuclear Power Plant (BelNPP) project in 2008, Lithuania has been raising concerns regarding the transparency and safety. These initiatives systemically face harsh opposition from the Belarusian or Russian authorities and their backed media outlets. **DebunkEU.org** partnered with the **Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania** to analyse disinformation used to manipulate the news regarding the BelNPP.

# ELECTION MONITORING



## Debunkeu.org LITHUANIAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS MONITORING

July - October 2020

Reports published: **3**


Content pieces analysed: **8204**

### SCOPE

Totally 822 Facebook posts were analyzed in the time period of August 1st to October 25th, 2020. Debunk EU detected 110 cases of negative communication concerning the Lithuanian parliamentary election. The increase of negative communication was detected after the first round of the election.

16 Facebook posts that included negative communication about elections and political parties were detected on the day after the first

Daily dynamics of Facebook posts by narrative




### TARGETING ELECTORAL PROCESS

Posts targeting the electoral process concludes 27.5% of detected negative messages and had three different narratives:

1. Elections in Lithuania is undemocratic and unfair;
2. Voting in the election is meaningless;
3. Voting in the election can pose threat to the voters.

#### Examples:




# ANALYTICAL APPROACH

July 15th - October 25th

Election interference from both external and internal state and non-state actors seeks to spread divisive narratives, and confuse voters, influence the outcome of an election, create confusion about electoral information discredit democracy itself and influence how a country is perceived externally.

Following the examples of electoral interference in national elections and strategies, that were used extensively from 2017 to influence the electoral process in different countries, analysts from Debunk EU distinguished between at least **three areas of risks**, associated with information environment:



Based on this categorization, information was aggregated into narratives, that would capture distinct stories and/or repeating messages, targeting the 2020 national election to the Seimas of Lithuania, and would present a more structured picture of the areas, that were targeted the most.



# MILITARY EXERCISE ANALYSIS





## DebunkEU.org and NATO StratCom CoE analysis on Zapad 2021

May - September 2021

Content pieces reviewed: **6275**

Cases of disinfo found: **1309**



## Disinformation analysis about the surge of migrants organized by Belarusian regime

September 1 - October 15, 2021

### Content analysed from:

Migrant linked Facebook groups

766

Online media from origin countries of migrants

679

Regional hostile (Kremlin affiliated) media sources

1295

English-language media outlets

352

3306

total content pieces

out of which


919

were false/misleading




## Disinformation analysis about the surge of migrants organized by Belarusian regime

Types of information by conditional classification



Types of information by dominant languages





4146 illegal immigrants have entered Lithuania in 2021 (as per October 19, 2021 according to the data from Lithuanian border control).

**Note:** number of migrants from other countries not shown on the map - 87.




## Kremlin and Belarusian regimes and their network of affiliated media and troll factories



# **LONG TERM STRATEGIES & TACTICS**



# MEDIA LITERACY: GAME'DUCATION APPROACH



The initial goal of 100 000 players **exceeded with 118 613 citizens** in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia who have played the game **163 103 times**.



BadNews game advertisements were shown **51 945 503 times** and reached **3 225 944 unique users** in the Baltic countries



Players made **22 754 148 pageviews**.



Throughout the span of communication campaign, **33 press releases** were published by media.



**22.35% of respondents** indicated that after playing the game, they started evaluating the content they see online more critically



# Civic Resilience Course for universities



## Countering disinformation: **civic resilience course**

Disinformation doesn't stand a chance when you know exactly how it works.

This is a practical one-hour crash course that will boost your critical thinking and media literacy skills in contemporary information sphere.


False and misleading information Forgery Social  
media Misinformation Propaganda  
Fake accounts Conspiracy theory Influence  
operations Clickbait Disinformation Trolls  
Bandwagon Twitter Facebook #Fake news  
Media Forgery Hyperbolization Social media  
Memes Misinformation Propaganda  
Conspiracy theory Influence operations Clickbait  
Disinformation Trolls Bandwagon Twitter Malign  
rhetoric Facebook #Fake news




# DISINFORMATION ANALYSIS TRAINING: THEORY



Course  
cover  
prototype



Course  
interface  
prototype



Providing knowledge  
on the most prominent  
disinformation  
**narratives, techniques,  
actors and sources** in  
a **3-4 hour** course.



Granting students a  
**certificate** upon completion  
of the course so they can  
join DebunkEU.org or other  
organisations.



Making the course **widely  
available** so more people  
can start contributing to  
global disinformation  
countering efforts.



Combining expertise of our  
analysts with **state of the  
art technology** with the  
help of Lithuanian digital  
course platform BitDegree.



BitDegree

# DISINFORMATION ANALYSIS TRAINING: PRACTICE



The **digital course** provides the **basis** for building disinformation analysis skills further.

DebunkEU.org provides an opportunity to **put this knowledge in practice** with **4-8 weeks follow-up training**.



Future analysts are **given access** to use the DebunkEU.org platform and **practice labelling** harmful content.

They work on an **assigned research project** with a **supervision** of our senior analysts (meetings 2 times per week).



Students produce **their own analysis reports** which are **evaluated** by our analysts and **published** on DebunkEU.org

# REACH OUT TO US



As a growing NGO, we are always on a look-out for **new opportunities, projects and collaborations.**

Therefore, if you could share valuable insights and ideas with us - **please email us at [viktoras@debunkeu.org](mailto:viktoras@debunkeu.org)**



Contacts of organisations to explore possibilities of **joining our efforts**,

Ways to **scale** our ongoing projects in other countries,



**Ideas** for media literacy and disinformation countering activities.

## Featured Reports



2 March 2021

**'Non-existent Russian threat' and suppression of free speech dominate the disinformation landscape**



26 February 2021

**Kremlin media: Lithuania risks Baltic unity by forbidding allies to import energy from Belarus**



18 February 2021

**Waging the 'vaccine war': attempts to prove the superiority of Sputnik V by using disinformation**



5 February 2021

**2020 has ended with allegations of the Baltics meddling in Belarus and suppressing Russian media**

## Latest News



# DebunkEU.org

---

EU Disinfo Lab 2021

“Understanding Disinformation Across Europe”

Viktoras Dauksas, Head of DebunkEU.org

Click to follow us on:

